State repression on the Islamic political opposition in Indonesia in the period of 2017-2021

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Abstract

Repressive approach is one of the state's responses to social movements taken to restrain or limit the action of a movement that always strives for a social change process in society. In this context, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam – FPI) are two Islamic groups that recently after 2016 have been active in pressuring the government on various political issues. The government responded to these two groups with repressive measures such as stigmatization, criminalization, and dissolving or banning the organization. This study aims to discuss the details of government policies in responding to both HTI and FPI in Indonesia using comparative analysis by collecting secondary data from the media, books, and journals relevant with this study. This study found that the Indonesian government has used various means to repress HTI and FPI, such as intimidation, stigmatization, and disbandment to the organizations.

Keywords: Islamic political movement; repressive approach; Indonesian government

1. Introduction

The dynamics of social movements are always interesting to study, and many are always trying to study this phenomenon. A social movement refers to a collection of actors, both individuals and organizations, who join together to fight for social change or the maintenance of the existing social order. A movement's struggle can progress smoothly and quickly in its dynamic; otherwise, it must occasionally confront conflicts between other movements, including the state.

Historically, there have been various social movements that have been accompanied by various social changes, either by the reformists or revolutionists. These changes do not come out by themselves but are driven by actors, activists, and movements that bring about change.

In the modern context, social movements manifest themselves in political movements, such as right-wing political movements, left-wing movements (Marxist/communist), environmental movements, feminist movements, anti-war movements, and Islamic movements. To achieve their ideals, these movements must face various conflicts and have taken different paths peacefully and violently. This article aims to study the Islamic political movements in Indonesia and their relationship with the country with a focus on the state's response to Islamic political movements in Indonesia under the 212 Movement since 2016.

Historically, the 212 movement was initiated by Islamic figures and movements that were offended by the statements of one of the former governors of DKI Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was considered to be blaspheming the teachings of Islam and the Quran. This movement eventually grew with the various demonstrations and demands they made. After a large demonstration on December 2, 2016, at the National Monument, Ahok was finally successfully imprisoned. Also, Ahok, who ran again for governor of Jakarta in 2017, suffered a defeat (Mietzner, 2018).

After 212 movement event, relationship between the state and the Islamic political movement became discordant. Some of the Islamic figures involved in the 212 actions finally had to be arrested after the reports of violations of the law they committed surfaced. Even, the government also increasingly intensified a number of anti-radicalism policies, one of which was by issuing a social organization law in 2017 that later had brought an impact on the dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (Aswar, 2018). In 2019, the legal license of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) as an organization was not granted and finally, in 2020, it was decided to be a banned organization in Indonesia (CNN Indonesia, 2020).

The two organizations above have existed and have been active in Indonesia for a long time, and they have enjoyed the democratic atmosphere in Indonesia after the reform (Yumitro et al., 2021). However, the political situation changed in 2016 because of the phenomenon of the 212 movements, which brought them into conflict with the ruling regime. This study concentrates on the government's strategy for dealing with

Islamic movements, particularly FPI and HTI, following the momentum of the 212 movements in 2016.

2. Conceptual Framework

The issue of social movement is closely related to the social change issue, as any social changes in society are driven by actors who mobilize the public to achieve the desired changes. In history, there have been many events of social change driven by social movement organizations.

Regarding the relationship of the movement to the state, the tendency of social movements will always be in conflict with the ruling regime since social movements want to change the existing order based upon the criticism of the existing social and political conditions. However, the attitude of the regime does not always confront the social movements with conflict; on the contrary, the state often adopts an accommodating attitude or supports the interests of the social movements. (Tarrow, 2011).

To suppress a movement, a state can choose many types of activities, as Jules Boykoff (2007) explained: First, resource depletion through violence against activists, imprisonment, and extraordinary rules and laws; second, stigmatization by creating a negative narrative about the character and reputation of personalities, activists, and movements with the goal of weakening the solidarity of the movement's supporters or individuals who participate in it; creating a negative reputation in the community and preventing new members from joining; third, divisive disruption through infiltration or provocation within a movement that causes conflict and division. This not only affects the cohesiveness of a movement, but also can damage the movement's public reputation. Fourth, intimidation by the state through various means, such as imprisonment, prosecution, and dismissal, including the issuance of special laws that can affect a movement. This method is used to divert the movement's attention from its original goal and to deal with the legal issues and internal problems it faces (Boykoff, 2007).

In discussing the state's policies towards the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia movement and the Islamic Defenders Front, Boykoff's approach is considered more complete in understanding the state's attitude towards these movements, in terms of both repressive strategies and tactics used to suppress social movements.

Academics were attracted by the events of the 212 movement and many studies appeared later to explain the phenomenon, such as that of Marcus Mietsner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi (2016), who explained the factors of mobilization of the 212 movement in 2016. Using quantitative and qualitative approach, Mietsner and Muhtadi refuted the claims of some authors who argued that there was a rise in radicalism that affected 212's actions. The quantitative data in Mietsner and Muhtadi's article oppositely showed that radicalism in Indonesia has declined through surveys conducted between 2010 and 2016. Mietsner and Muhtadi explained that the potential rise of the 212 movement was due to the previous regime accommodating the FPI and other Islamist movements, thereby strengthening them institutionally. Then, in the Jokowi era, Jokowi's political stance has become a reason for the FPI to move and oppose the Jokowi government (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018).

In the context of the state policy towards the 212 movement, various studies seemed to highlight the state's attitude that is believed to reduce the quality of democracy in Indonesia (democratic regression). They acknowledge the threat to democracy in Indonesia posed by Islamic movements, and the government's policies are also seen undemocratic and have become a boomerang for democracy in Indonesia itself (Mietzner, 2018; Power, 2018; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019).

The study by Hasbi Aswar et al. (2020) examined state policy in the perspective of social movements with a focus on state policy towards Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia. The study described several strategies used by the state, such as stigmatization, intimidation, and special regulations, to legitimize the dissolution of the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement (Aswar et al., 2020).

After reviewing all the relevant literature in this study, most authors focused on the political dynamics of the 212 movement and the decline of Indonesian democracy, examining the rise of the Islamic opposition and how states dealt with this issue. The focus of this article is on analyzing the state's responses to the Islamic movements, particularly Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic Defender Front (FPI). It explains the strategy in responding to these two groups in the perspective of a social movement.

3. Methodology

This is a case study research as a part of qualitative research where a specific topic has been selected from a general idea. This study is a social movement analysis focused on the state repression against social movements and deals with a specific case in Indonesia. In addition, this study uses a comparative method to understand the state policies towards both movements. In conducting the research, data have been obtained by collecting literature from books, journals, and media coverage, as well as sources belonging to the government and social movements examined in this study.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 Islamic political movement under Jokowi era

2016 is known as the year of the rise of the Islamic political movement in Indonesia, when tens of thousands of people gathered to voice their opposition to one of the former governors of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, on the issue of blasphemy. This action impacted Ahok's accelerated legal process, and he was eventually thrown in prison for two years even though Ahok had apologized for his statement of attitude (West, 2018).

The problem of Ahok's rejection did not occur only during blasphemy events. It started in 2014, when Ahok led Jakarta in 2014 as the successor of Joko Widodo after he ran for president. Ahok's style of speech, saying things rudely, became part of the story of the public's rejection of Ahok. In addition, the Muslim community of Jakarta felt that there was a policy by Ahok that harmed Muslims. The rejection became higher after Ahok planned to be governor in the 2017 gubernatorial election since he is a Christian. Throughout 2015, various actions were carried out by Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir Action, which voiced its rejection of Muslim leaders. Ahok responded

to various rejections of his candidacy with a statement made during a working visit to Jakarta's Kepulauan Seribu Regency, stating that Muslims are fooled by using *Surah* al-Maidah. Due to Ahok's statement, Islamic groups such as HTI, FUI, and FPI and figures in MUI began to make movements to demand that the government put Ahok in jail. The National Movement for Fatwa Defence (MUI) (GNPF-MUI) was formed. Various actions were carried out under the slogan "Action to Defend Islam" and culminated on December 2, 2016, at the National Monument, attended by hundreds of thousands of participants from various regions in Indonesia (Parameswaran, 2017).

After the events of 212, Ahok was found guilty by the court and then arrested and imprisoned for two years. However, the story still continues in which the anti-Ahok Islamic movement is also active in criticizing Joko Widodo's government through various issues raised, such as the issue of Joko Widodo's closeness to China, communism, and the criminalization of Islamic figures (West, 2018). Following the Ahok incident, police arrested a number of Islamic figures on various charges, including the nationalist figures.

Along with the arrest of Islamic opposition figures, the narrative of counter-radicalism, counter-intolerance, and safeguarding NKRI and Pancasila was echoed by the Joko Widodo government. Facing an active Islamic movement, the Jokowi administration uses the language of ideological commitment, i.e. the enforcement of Pancasila and NKRI, through the slogan "Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila" (I am Indonesia, I am Pancasila). The government even established a special institution, the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP), which is considered an effort to stem Islamic groups' narrative that is becoming increasingly powerful and influential (Hadiz, 2017).

According to the researchers, various attempts to criminalize the figures are seen as the panic responses from the Joko Widodo government that impact the inability of this regime to provide a proportional response instead of being a boomerang for the regime itself (Busch, 2017). Jokowi's policy toward the opposition is considered to weaken Indonesian democracy. Jokowi's repressive policy towards the opposition was considered a return to authoritarian political attitudes in Indonesia after the new order and the weakening of democracy in Indonesia (T. P. Power, 2018).

4.2 State repression of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia in 2017

Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is a part of Hizb ut-Tahrir globally with a focus on fighting for state governance based upon Islamic sharia through the enforcement of an Islamic state or caliphate. The movement declared itself as a political party in Jordan in 1953. The Hizb ut-Tahrir movement entered Indonesia in the 1980s through Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, who then began da'wah activities in Indonesia clandestinely until an open declaration in 2000 through an international caliphate conference in Jakarta (Zarkasyi, 2008).

Subsequently, Hizb ut-Tahrir actively conducted campaigns and socialization activities for sharia enforcement and the caliphate through various agendas, such as discussions, seminars, conferences, meetings with figures, *Masirah* (demonstrations), and various publications, such as al-Waie's monthly magazine, Al-Islam Friday leaflets, and the Biweekly

tabloid Media Umat. All the above activities are carried out to encourage the community to support and engage in sharia and Khilafah enforcement efforts. It is estimated that HTI has had approximately 40,000 members and 2 million sympathizers (Aswar, 2018).

Post-political reform in Indonesia has provided a great space for HTI to move freely and openly. This movement has obtained a registration certificate (SKT) as a legal organization in Indonesia, and obtained the status of a legal entity (BHP) from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights in 2014. As a legal organization, HTI is free and activel in contact and discussion with officials in Indonesia, both executive, legislative, and judicial. Even HTI officials have been part of the board of the Indonesian Ulema Council for the period 2005–2010 (Aswar et al., 2020).

The government's accommodative attitude towards the HTI movement changed after the events of the 212 movement. After the leaders of the 212 movement were litigated in certain legal cases, in 2017, HTI was dissolved by the Joko Widodo government through a government regulation in lieu of law (Perppu Ormas, Number 2 of 2017). The issuance of this *perppu* was chosen by the government because it was considered as the fastest effort in making decisions against anti-Pancasila organizations that threaten the Republic of Indonesia. Meanwhile, if the provisions of the existing social organization law No. 17 of 2013 are used, the process can take months. Through this *perppu*, a time-consuming process can be shortened. Furthermore, whereas the dissolution of an organization was a right of the court in the 2013 Community Organization Law, the organization can be dissolved by the ministry that provides legality to an organization in the new law, perppu 2017 (Aswar et al., 2020, p. 189).

Before the announcement of the dissolution of HTI, the steps taken to contain HTI by the Jokowi regime could already be seen through the prohibition of HTI activities in various regions of Indonesia. From April to May 2017, HTI held a national campaign activity themed on the Prophet's banner, which was in many places stopped by the police because it was blocked by *Banser* and *Ansor* Nahdlatul Ulama. In these times, Banser and Ansor showed a firm and hard attitude towards HTI through the mobilization of members to stop HTI activities that are considered troubling and can undermine the unity of the nation and state. However, the researchers see that the actions of the Banser and Ansor organizations are the part of the Joko Widodo administration's strategy to legitimize the stoppage of HTI activities in Indonesia. This can be seen from the silence as if the regime allowed the act of persecution of an organization by other organizations that principally is not allowed and has violated the law (Fealy, 2018; Mietzner, 2018, p. 276).

In addition to intercept HTI activities, HTI figures da`wa activities are being cancelled, such as in public studies, study on campuses, and Ramadan lectures in various mosques, such as Felix Siauw, and Ismail Yusanto (Affan, 2017).

To legitimize the dissolution of HTI, the government's main narrative on HTI has been focused on the ideology of HTI, which is considered as anti-Pancasila and anti-NKRI. The narrative then has always been repeated by the government on various occasions to get a support from public. In the announcement, the government emphasized three important

points to dissolve HTI including:

1. HTI does not play a positive role in the development process in order to achieve national goals.
2. The activities carried out by HTI are strongly indicated to have been contrary to the objectives, principles, and characteristics based on Pancasila and the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 as stipulated in Law No. 17 of 2013 concerning Community Organization.
3. The activities carried out by HTI are considered to have caused clashes in the community and can threaten the security and order of the community and threaten the integrity of NKRI (Erdianto, 2017b).

The government narratives are supported by Nahdlatul Ulama, as Said Aqil Siradj stated that the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) movement is contrary to the vision of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia until its dissolution is necessary. For the safety of the Republic of Indonesia and the integrity of the Indonesian nation, any organization that undermines Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and does not respect Bhinneka Tunggal Ika should be banned. Hizb ut-Tahrir is an organization that seeks to form a centralized Islamic government as it was during the caliphate. This goal means to eliminate any existing countries, including Indonesia (Editor of We Online, 2018). In addition to NU, organizations that are members of the Islamic Ormas Friendship Institute (LPOI) also supported the dissolution of HTI, such as Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah, Al Washliyah, the Association of Muslims (PUI), the Islamic Association (PERSIS), the Association of Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI), Mathla'ul Anwar, the Az Zikra Foundation, Al-Ittihadiyah, the Indonesian Dai Association (IKADI), Rabithah Alawiyah, the Indonesian Chinese Islamic Association (PITI), Nahdlatul Wathan, and the Indonesian Converts Association (HBMI) (Erdianto, 2017a).

4.3 State Repression against the Islamic Defenders Front

After successfully dissolving HTI, three years later, on December 30, 2020, the government then disbanded another Islamic organization, i.e. the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). This organization was established at the Al-Um Kampung Utan boarding school, Ciputat, South Jakarta, on August 17, 1998. This organization was founded by Muslim activists and Muslims, as well as haba'ibs, Ulama, and muballigh, and Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab as the main figure in this group. The number of sympathizers in the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has increased over time. These sympathizers not only are the members but also have established FPI branches in some areas, including Surakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta, as well as in several cities in Indonesia (Jamhari, 2004).

The FPI was formed four months after President Suharto stepped his power down in 1998. The era of reform marked the end of Suharto's authoritarian rule, which did not tolerate any kinds of extreme measures. FPI is one of the Islamic organizations that took an opportunity in the reform era to form a restricted Islamic organization, even though it was banned in the Suharto era. This organization was formed with the aim of becoming a forum for cooperation between scholars and the ummah in upholding *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*.

The historical roots of the selection of the name "FPI (Islamic Defenders Front)," i.e. the word "front," meaning "front," want to show that FPI always strives to be an organization that is at the forefront and able to be firm in every step of the struggle. Then, the word "defender" indicates that FPI will always play an active role in defending and fighting for the rights of Islam and Muslims. In terms of the word "Islam" as a characteristic, this organization's struggle is inextricably linked to the bond of straight and true Islamic teachings. Under the name "Islamic Defenders Front," the organization will defend the "values" and "teachings" of Islam, not for the benefits of any individual or group. (Jamhari, 2004). The background of the establishment of FPI was based on several things, including:

1. Muslims in Indonesia have long suffered as a result of the weak social control of civilian and military rulers, as well as many violations of human rights committed by the ruling person.
2. The failure of the state apparatus to enforce the law and maintain state order
3. Every Muslim is obligated to uphold Islam's dignity.
4. Every Muslim must follow the commandment to makruf nahi mungkar."

Furthermore, the purpose of the FPI's establishment, as stated in the FPI minutes and lines of struggle, is to enforce *Amar makruf Nahi Munkar*. In addition, this organization was formed to help the government to quell social problems in society, such as prosthetics, gambling, and drug transactions. The FPI's efforts in overcoming the moral crisis that has struck this nation are to carry out harmonious cooperation among all elements of society, including scholars, leaders, and all Muslims (Ng, 2006).

FPI established two organizational structures, namely Jamaah FPI and Laskar (Fighter) FPI, to achieve organizational goals and optimize organizational activities. FPI Jamaah is in charge of carrying out religious, and social activities, such as study, social service, and education, while the Laskar (fighter) FPI is in charge of putting physical pressure on entertainment venues, sweeping, and holding demonstrations. Laskar is like a military or militia unit under the command of the chairman of the FPI. As a doctrine to the followers of the FPI movement that their leaders are the haba'ib and scholars who are a reflection of the saints who gain religious legitimacy (Ng, 2006).

FPI claimed that the character of its movement is traditionalist meaning to be involved society - not exclusive. Habib Rizieq Shihab (HRS), the founder of FPI, stated that FPI builds loyalty to Islam, not to figures or organizations. As long as its figures and organizations are carried out according to Islamic sharia, it must be adhered to. Therefore, as an Islamic organization, FPI shows its strength as a pressure group (opposition) against political actors who are considered contradictory to Islam, for instance by not giving political support for candidates who are considered incompatible with Islamic sharia (Syihab R. H., 2008) (Rentika Waty & Kamarudin, 2020).

In opposition, the FPI massively has conducted the sweeping (closing the places having the immorality values) and demonstrations considered irrelevant to Islamic sharia. The opposition of the FPI as a pressure group can be seen through

the conflict between the FPI and the government regime. FPI's opposition to the regime has begun since the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) when Indonesia's political conditions were unstable in 1999. The role of FPI as the opposition still remains until today.

According to FPI, the political system implemented in Indonesia (democracy) has created a corrupt system, generated the dictators, and caused some problems due to power struggles. HRS considered that Islamic Sharia and democracy have very fundamental differences. The Islamic system is godhead, sourced from Allah SWT, who is perfect. While, democracy comes from the human mind, which has limitations, so it is imperfect. The law applied to Islamic law comes from Allah SWT through the Qur'an and As-Sunnah, while democracy is based on who gets the most votes (Syihab H. R., 2021).

Islamic law does not separate religious affairs from the state, but in a democratic system, the two are separated. In Islam, the voice of the clergy is not similar with the voice of ordinary people, whereas, in a democratic system, everyone has the same voting rights. This makes FPI known as a radical organization. The FPI's bravery made them vulnerable to various threats and intimidation. FPI has experienced at least five incidents. First, on April 11, 1999, there was a shooting by an unknown person. HRS on S. Parman Taman Anggrek Apartment was the target of the shoot. His shot went through the windshield and lodged in the dashboard. Second, Habib Sholeh Alattas, an advisor to the DPP-FPI, was shot on July 23, 2000. An unidentified man shot him after morning prayers at the mosque. Third, the shooting of Cecep Bustomi, the declarator of FPI, on July 24, 2000. He was chased and shot by a group of unknown riders. Fourth, the shooting of the FPI Army monitoring team by the West Jakarta Police Headquarters on December 11, 2000. Fifth, the looting and burning of the house of the Chairman of the Shura Assembly of the FPI, Habib Sholeh Al-Habsyi, on December 13, 2000. The last case was the shooting of FPI members by the police, and the FPI was dissolved by the Jokowi administration.

Before the dissolution of FPI, FPI's relationship with the government heated up when Jokowi-Ahok became the Governor and Deputy Governor of DKI Jakarta from 2012–2017. Jokowi ran for president in the 2014 presidential election and won. FPI rejected Ahok's appointment as Governor of DKI Jakarta for several reasons:1) FPI believed that the leader of Muslims should be Muslim; 2) Ahok was considered to be in violation of ethics for frequently speaking inhospitably; 3) Ahok was considered insulting to the institution of the DPRD (Regional People's Representative Assembly) during the polemic of the regional head election; 4) FPI argued that, based on Perppu Number 1 of 2014 concerning elections, the deputy governor does not automatically become governor (Rentika Waty & Kamarudin, 2020).

FPI did not support Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election since he supported Ahok as the Governor of DKI Jakarta. Furthermore, Ahok was considered to have committed blasphemy in Surah Al-Maidah: 58 during the 2017 Jakarta Election. This provoked a reaction from the FPI, so they spearheaded Action 212 or Movement 212 (formerly known as Action for Islamic Defence) in the National Movement of Fatwa Guards of the Indonesian Ulama Council (GNPF-MUI)

as a form of protest over the case. Along with Ahok's case, HRS was accused of being involved in cases of pornographic chat and blasphemy against Pancasila. HRS was later named as a suspect in the case. Then, in February 2018, HRS was made a suspect in the Pancasila desecration case, but the police stopped investigating it in February 2018 in view of no solid evidence (Pamungkas & Oktaviani, 2017).

The government officially disbanded the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and banned any activities carried out on behalf of the FPI. The dissolution and termination of the activity were stated in the Joint Decree (SKB) on the Prohibition of Activities for the Use of Symbols and Attributes and the Termination of FPI Activities. The decree was signed by Minister of Home Affairs Tito Karnavian, Minister of Law and Human Rights (Menkumham) Yasonna Laoly, Minister of Communication and Information (Menkominfo) Johnny G. Plate, Police Chief General Idham Azis, Attorney General ST Burhanuddin, and Head of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) Boy Rafly Amar. Here, the government considered six points in deciding to dissolve and stop FPI activities including:

1. The existence of Law No. 16 of 2017 concerning Community Organizations (Ormas), which is intended to maintain the existence of ideology and basic consensus of the state, namely Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.
2. The contents of the FPI articles of association are declared contrary to Article 2 of the Law on Community Organization.
3. The Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 01-00-00/010/D.III.4/VI/2014, dated June 20, 2014, concerning the FPI Registered Certificate (SKT), was valid until June 20, 2019, and until now, has not been eligible to extend the SKT.
4. Community organizations must not conflict with Article 5 letter g, Article 6 letter f, Article 21 letters b and d, Article 59 Paragraph (3) letters a, c, and d, Article 59 Paragraph (4) c, and Article 82A of the Law on Community Organization.
5. According to data, FPI administrators and/or members, as well as those who have joined FPI, account for up to 35 people involved in terrorism crimes. Of these, 29 have been convicted.
6. Administrators and/or FPI members are breaking the law when conducting various raids or sweeping in the community. In fact, this activity is the duty and authority of law enforcement officials (Farisa, 2020).

By looking at the six legal considerations, FPI is not only prohibited from carrying out activities but also not allowed to install any symbols, images, or attributes. Moreover, the government also prohibits the public from attending and participating in activities held by FPI. The government uses legality to declare FPI as a banned organization similar to the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Indonesian Islamic Students (PII), and Marhaen Youth (Pitoyo Ismail & Ohorella, 2021).

Before dissolving the FPI, the government persecuted it with the arrest of FPI Chairman Mohammad Rizieq Shihab.

Rizieq Shihab was accused of violating health protocols by organizing two activities that involved a large mass presence: marrying his daughter, Shafira Najwa Shihab, and holding the Prophet Muhammad's Birthday event on November 14, 2020, in Petamburan, Central Jakarta. The dissolution and termination of the activity were stated in the Joint Decree (SKB) on the Prohibition of Activities for the Use of Symbols and Attributes and the Termination of FPI Activities. Both charges led Mohammad Rizieq Shihab to a detention centre to follow the investigation and trial process (Puspita, 2020; Farisa, 2020).

Besides, as part of the repression by the government, police officers carried out a shooting that killed six FPI members on December 7, 2020, at the Jakarta-Cikampek Toll Road. In this case, FPI has been still seeking for justice by pursuing legal channels. Another government policy related to FPI was related to the blocking of 92 accounts of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) by the Financial Transaction Reporting and Analysis Centre (PPATK). In fact, referring to Law Number 8 of 2010, Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5, and Article 44, Paragraph 1, the object of the TPPU is the result of a criminal act or the alleged result of a criminal act. There are personal accounts, personal people, and families in the 92 accounts that had nothing to do with FPI. In addition, in the law of Community Organization, there is no provision that the frozen organization means that the funds owned by the organization are automatically the result of a crime.

4.4 Comparison of state repression against Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia and the Islamic defenders front

The Jokowi government's policy of dissolving HTI and FPI has reflected a tough stance towards groups considered radical by the state. There is a difference in the dissolution of these two groups of organizations. Although HTI has been disbanded, the movement carried out by sympathizers on behalf of HTI remains scattered started at the scope of the campus and ended at the mosque. While FPI, in its movement, is slightly softer than HTI, namely because of NKRI's affixing, after the dissolution of the FPI, the organization has formed a new group, the Islamic Brotherhood Front (Front Persaudaraan Islam, or FPI). The dissolution of HTI was carried out by the government on July 19, 2017 earlier than FPI. Meanwhile, FPI was dissolved by the government on December 30, 2020. To justify the dissolution of HTI, the government's main point of blame was related to the anti-Pancasila and anti-NKRI ideology. The narrative of this organization as an anti-Pancasila organization is always repeated by the government on various occasions to get support from the public regarding the government's attitude towards this organization.

In addition to the basic differences in the dissolution of HTI and FPI described above, there are also differences in repressive behavior towards these two organizations. After the dissolution of HTI, the government's attitude was not as harsh as it was towards FPI. After the freezing of FPI, the government continues to take repressive measures against FPI through the arrests of the leaders of this organization, freezing of accounts, and even extrajudicial killings carried out by the police

4. Conclusion

The dynamics of social movements are always interesting to study, and there are always many who try to study this

phenomenon. A social movement is a collection of actors, both individuals, and organizations, that move together to fight for social change or maintain the existing social order. In its dynamics, the struggle of a movement can run smoothly and achieve goals easily; otherwise, it sometimes must deal with conflicts with other movements, including the state. This research raises the issue of the phenomenon of Islamic political movements in Indonesia and their relationship with the state by focusing on the state's response to HTI and FPI after the momentum of 212. This article found that the rise of Islamic opposition led by hizb ut-Tahrir in Indonesia & Islamic Defender Front since 2016 was perceived by the government as a threat so that both should be contained. The government`s policy toward these two groups is mostly similar: to dissolve and disband the groups and stigmatize them as anti-NKRI and anti-Pancasila groups. The difference between the two is that the government and its supporters got involved to criminalize the FPI`s members, including freezing their financial assets, while HTI did not face that. Overall, this study demonstrates that the state can use any repressive strategy to respond to a challenger within the state.

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